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Abstract 
 
The paper studies the dynamics of the social chronotope formed in the Russian and Ukrainian 
border regions in times of nonequilibrium turbulent chaos, which was present in this geopolitical space 
for the past two decades. The cross-border social chronotope is referred to as an established cultural 
model inherent in the collective conscience of the borderland residents, which reflects the specificity of 
interpersonal relations between border dwellers and their self-identification with phenomena of the past, 
the present, and the future. This paper proves that following the disintegration of the USSR, the dominant 
cultural model in the Russian-Ukrainian borderlands ceased to exist and two separate chronotope systems 
emerged on either side of the border. Their autonomy is further proved by the growing mutual 
misunderstanding between the border communities and a broadening gap in their interpretation of the 
past, the present and the future. In this paper, each social chronotope is analyzed as a dissipative system. 
At the same time, the need for security affects ambiguously the dynamics of the social chronotope. On the 
one hand, it consolidates the regional border communities; on the other hand, it serves as a potential 
source of dissatisfaction with the actions of the authorities as incapable of removing a set of dangers and 
threats.  
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1. Introduction 
After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the zones of geopolitical and politic-cultural 
delimitation emerged along the borders of new states. Such delimitation is viewed as a process of 
designation of statuses of adjacent geopolitical formations; as a result of this process the citizens of one 
state form strong convictions of the political and cultural systems of the neighbouring state. The above 
mentioned zones as a whole may be defined as the “post-Soviet borderlands”. The authors argue that this 
geopolitical and cultural and civilizational phenomenon has a potential to play a significant role in the 
global space which reconciles the processes of integration and unification with cultural and civilizational 
(often ethnocultural) self-determination and development. This potential, inherent in the borderlands, 
being a creative force, an on-going process (Soja, 1996) that makes them both contact zones between 
cultures and civilizations and sources of conflicts at the regional and global scales.    
 
2. Problem Statement 
Despite a vast number of research papers exploring the relations between Russia and Ukraine 
(Chernomaz, 2014; Kolosov, 2011; Manoylo, 2014; Zhurzhenko, 2011), the research does not offer a 
comprehensive concept of the socio-cultural aspect of the Russian-Ukrainian borderlands development, 
although such aspect is as important in the global context as socio-economic or political spheres. .   
 
3. Research Questions 
The analysis of border zones as zones of inter-civilizational contacts and confrontation are 
particularly relevant for the Russian-Ukrainian borderlands as the relations in this zone are in the spotlight 
of the global and national elites and significantly affect the global policy.   
 
4. Purpose of the Study 
The objective of this paper is to attempt to interpret the socio-cultural aspect of the dynamics of 
the Russian-Ukrainian borderlands development applying the chaos theory.   
 
5. Research Methods 
The research is based on the findings of the sociological questionnaire survey “Development of 
New Identities in Border Regions of Russia and Ukraine” conducted by the authors in 2015 among 
residents of Belgorod, Bryansk, Voronezh and Kursk regions in Russia and Kharkiv, Sumy, Chernyhiv 
and Luhansk regions in Ukraine; the sample is a quota multistage, and the quota attributes include 
residence, sex, and age; n = 1000.   
 
6. Findings 
In this research the authors elaborate on the image of a social chronotope that dominated in the 
collective conscience of the residents of the Russian-Ukrainian borderlands for a long period (over three 
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centuries); this chronotope was based on the idea of cultural similarity of Russians (Great Russians) and 
Ukrainians (Little Russians). The similarity was localized within a limited geographical area and rested 
on the kinship and interpersonal contacts and – to a certain extent – differentiated border dwellers from 
residents of other Russian and Ukrainian regions both in terms of their local interests and in their 
ethnocultural characteristics, which was especially evident in Ukrainian and Russian urban areas. The 
Ukrainian historian V.V. Sklyar argues “A peculiarity of the South-Eastern and Eastern borderlands is the 
presence of significant differences in ethnic composition and languages spoken in border rural areas and 
regional capitals, especially in Kharkiv, Donetsk and Luhansk regions” (Sklyar, 2006, 22-23, our trans.).    
In this context, the chronotope is referred to as a cultural model construed consciously or 
unconsciously by individuals to identify themselves simultaneously with the current surroundings, 
ancestors and bearers of the ideal future. This model assumes that each individual forms bonds with the 
past, the present and the future creating a consistent outlook and a vision of a particular place in the world 
as well as explicit and implicit incentives to social action. A borderland chronotope is an established 
cultural model inherent in the collective conscience of the border dwellers that reflects the specificity of 
relations between borderland residents and their self-identification with phenomena in the past, the 
present, and the future.  
The borderland chronotope development was not free from challenges and controversies. The political 
demands of time often led to socio-cultural misbalances, for instance, to the so-called Ukrainization in 
certain Russian regions and de-Ukrainization in the Ukrainian counterparts. Moreover, V.V. Bublikov 
and V.V. Markova point out that both processes took place almost simultaneously in the 1920ies and 
1930ies (Bublikov and Markova, 2014, 54-55). Obviously, the dominant chronotope was not unique. 
Both Russian and Ukrainian border regions saw a rise of marginal cultural models. It was particularly 
evident in Ukraine which was never homogenous in terms of cultural and civilizational identities. In the 
process of reinventing their nation, or “constructing homelands”, the nationalist elites strived to mobilize 
“the myths and images of a primordial homeland to reinforce the depiction of the nation as an ancient 
community of belonging” (Kaiser, 2002, 230). An example to this may be the so-called “Galician 
tradition” which in the 1990ies took the form of the “Ukrainian Piemonte” by analogy with the historic 
region in North Italy as a symbol of national renaissance (Dergachev, 2007).  
Nevertheless, since the second half of the 20th century, the dominant social chronotope in the 
Russian-Ukrainian borderlands was established as a socio-cultural system. Its stability was maintained, in 
one respect, by its nucleus – common values, including not only the official Soviet values but also 
universal human values of interpersonal communication between similar in their lifestyle communities 
and, in the other respect, from the outside, at the institutional level, through typical Soviet national 
political strategies. This system was linear, open and rather successful in times of political stability.  
The disintegration of the USSR has destabilized the Russian-Ukrainian borderlands and resulted in 
nonequilibrium turbulent chaos where, as argued by I. Prigozhin and I. Stengers, “we have such an 
abundance of macroscopic time and length scales that the system appears chaotic (Prigozhin and 
Stengers, 1986). The social space defined by turbulent chaos is extremely unstable and orderless. As D. 
Gleick argues, turbulent chaos violates the rules functioning in a linear system. “All the rules seem to 
break down” (Gleick, 1987, 121). In turbulence, rigid systems turn into dissipative ones. Their behaviour 
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is determined by strange attractors, the complex phenomena which serve as points of attraction in 
nonequilibrium systems. 
The disintegration of the Soviet Union, which led to emergence of multiple social phenomena both 
within its territory and beyond it, was a trigger for transformation of the dominant social chronotope of 
the Russian-Ukrainian borderlands from a linear to a dissipative system. This process was rather long; it 
offered multiple possibilities at different stages and ultimately has destroyed the relatively solid cultural 
model. 
Our research proves that at present the social chronotope of the Russian-Ukrainian borderlands has 
a number of traits implying its chaotization in response to the unstable environment.  
Firstly, the chronotope has disintegrated into the Russian and Ukrainian components becoming 
even less coherent over time. Interpersonal relations, even between family members, show signs of 
mutual alienation. Surprisingly, this trend is more evident in Russian border regions. As shown by the 
research, only 19.6% of the Russian respondents vs. 47.2% of Ukrainians report mutual understanding 
with their relatives across the border. Such misbalance may be explained by a certain “failed expectations 
syndrome” when the other’s behaviour has proved to differ from what was expected. Pointedly, 52.4% of 
Russian citizens attribute the change in their attitude towards Ukrainians to the so-called “Euromaidan” 
which has become a bifurcation point in chaotization of the Ukrainian reality.  
Broadening the communication gap and overall alienation are important signals of destruction of 
the common social chronotope and emergence of relatively independent chronotopes on either side of the 
border. While the previous cultural model was supra-ethnic, new chronotopes are ethnocentric in their 
core. 
Secondly, the attitudes of Russian and Ukrainian border dwellers are becoming not only 
incongruent, but opposite in many respects. It is particularly evident in self-identification: for instance, 
the absolute majority of the respondents from Russian border regions identify themselves with the 
Russian culture (70.8%). A small share (8.8%) of the respondents reports their belonging to the European; 
9.2% – to the global; and 2.6% - to the Eurasian culture.  
On the contrary, almost a quarter of the respondents (24.2%) in the Ukrainian borderland claims to 
belong to the global; 18.6% - to the European culture; and only 15.8% to the Ukrainian, 11.8% – to the 
Russian, and 11.2% - to the Eurasian cultures. 45.6% of the respondents claim to be Russians and 13.0% 
– Ukrainians ethnically. Other respondents believe ethnic self-identification to be insignificant. 15.8 of 
the respondents identify themselves with their city or region; 12.0%  with the corresponding macroregion; 
6.0% believe to be cosmopolitans and 3.4% – Europeans (the others could not answer). 
Therefore, while self-identification of Russian border dwellers is rather homogenous, this process 
in the Ukrainian borderland is differentiated and displays the traces of the traditional self-identification 
with Russia and the Russian culture.    
Thirdly, the research has revealed disparities in the symbolic representations of the past in the 
Russian and Ukrainian pubic conscience, although such disparities are less evident than the differences in 
self-identification. For instance, the question “What do you feel proud of?” has rendered the following 
answers: 50.4% of the Russian respondents name the victory in the Great Patriotic War (World War II) 
and 46.8% – the historic heritage. Among Ukrainians, the victory in the Great Patriotic War (World War 
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II) is mentioned only by 33.8% of the respondents, and 28.4% of the survey participants report to be 
proud of the historic part. Only 20.8% of Russians believe that the common Soviet past unites Russians 
and Ukrainians, while this statement is supported by 27.0% of Ukrainians. 26.8% of the Russian and 
37.0% of the Ukrainian respondents believe that the common history both unites and separates the two 
nations. 
The findings of the research give grounds to conclude that the image of the common historic past 
is gradually smearing in the collective conscience of Russian and Ukrainian border dwellers, though is 
still partially consolidating for the communities. Such smearing is even faster in the Russian regions in 
comparison with the Ukrainian borderland where a number of the Soviet symbols still hold significance 
being considered “quasi-Imperial”, rather than Russian, attributes.  
Fourthly, the emerging social chronotopes feature a significant gap in the image of the future for Russia 
and Ukraine. Among Russian citizens, the idea that Russia and Ukraine should coexist as independent 
states is gaining popularity (29.2.%); the relative majority (37.0%) see the two nations as neutral states, 
and only 16.8% of the respondents would like to rebuild a single state. In Ukraine, on the contrary, the 
dominant image is that of a single state (35.6%); 31.6% of the survey participants want to see Russia and 
Ukraine as neutral states, and 25.4% – as independents allies. 
The authors believe that the orientation to integration and cooperation, prevailing in Ukrainian 
border regions, may also be explained by the inertial Soviet tradition. Yet, it goes in line with the natural 
wish to find stability and security in the social chaos. Such stability is often sought in 
reinstitutionalization of the USSR. Yet, obviously, the ongoing social processes make this idea 
increasingly delusive denying the possibility to become a significant attractor of social borderland 
chronotopes.  
In this context, it is important to determine the strange attractors of development of social 
chronotopes formed in the Russian-Ukrainian borderlands.  
The authors believe that the strange attractors in Ukrainian border regions are the following two 
phenomena: need for security and national self-determination. To a certain extent, these phenomena are 
interconnected but each has a different development pathway.  
Need for security is cultivated by a number of various real and imaginary factors inherent in the 
turbulent chaos. This attractor may be called strange because it is specific for each region. For instance, 
the so-called Novorossiya (Donetsk and Luhansk regions) feels need for safety and security as a result of 
the ongoing military actions. The majority of other regions seek security as a reaction to the conflict with 
Russia (Russia’s aggression), speculated over in mass media, and fear of marginal organizations. 
Illustrating the significance of this phenomenon, this research has shown that security is the most 
significant value for Ukrainians with the respondents giving it 7.8. point out of 10.  
Depending on the intention, need for security may either consolidate the borderland with other 
Ukrainian regions or widen the gap between them.  
The rise of national self-determination is another significant attractor of the evolution of the 
Ukrainian borderland chronotope. In the recent years, the national idea has become an important part of 
the state ideology and the focus of multiple studies in the Ukrainian ethnicity. For instance, V.M. Sklyar 
writes “… in the focus of attention of researchers [ethnophilosophers] there are the Ukrainian national 
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idea, ethnic archetypes, and the ethnomental phenomena of being Ukrainian” (Sklyar, 2006, our trans.) 
The national idea and growing anti-Russian sentiment have become elements of Ukraine’s home and 
foreign policy and have consolidated the majority of the population. 
At the same time, the Ukrainian border regions, due to their historically strong bonds with Russia, 
do not have strong anti-Russian sentiment. Moreover, it is not always accepted by the population of these 
regions and becomes the basis for hidden (except for Novorossiya) conflicts. Nevertheless, national 
awareness is gradually spreading in the borderlands, especially, among the youth. This trend may have 
adverse effects for the chronotope because, apart from moral aspects (radicalization entails various 
phobias and extremism), it reduces cross-border contacts, as is seen in the recent years.   
The social chronotope in the Russian borderland has rather different strange attractors. We argue 
that the most significant attractor is the bureaucratization of culture, as it covers all aspects of the public 
life. The bureaucratization of culture is referred to as total formalization of the sociocultural space by the 
existing state administration system. The bureaucratization of culture leads to its simulation manifested in 
substitution of real actions with decoration, declaration and demonstration. As a result, the process of the 
social chronotope development becomes fully controlled by the state but gradually loses its impulse for 
self-development and limits itself to certain stereotypes-simulacra. The bureaucratization of the dynamics 
of the social chronotope can be seen, for instance, in the rise of paternalistic views (56.2% of the 
respondents believe that the state should take care of all citizens and provide them with an adequate 
standard of living, whereas only 24.6% think that the state should create a level playing field and ensure 
the rules are not violated). Moreover, 46.8% of the respondents prefer material welfare and only 28.6% – 
political rights and freedoms.  
In this context, the state bureaucracy becomes the primary creator of a cultural model and its 
reliable protector. In line with this, 42.6% of the Russian respondents have claimed that the state is the 
most consistent in protection and development of the national culture.  
Yet, border regions are a space for implementation of the state foreign policy which does not have 
absolute norms, while a social chronotope requires cultural constants. In view of this, the 
bureaucratization of culture is charged with an imminent conflict with consequences that are 
unpredictable in nonequilibrium turbulent chaos.          
The second strange attractor for the dynamics of the Russian border chronotope coincides with that 
in Ukraine and constitutes the need for security. Residents of the Russian borderland feel anxiety because 
of chaotization of the Ukrainian reality as opposed to stability in Russia. This anxiety increases the 
importance of security, which is even of a higher priority for Russians than for Ukrainians (8.3 out of 10). 
It is further proved by the fact that the Russian respondents named aggression as one of the most 
significant traits of Ukrainians (34.2%), which contradicts the traditional image of the Ukrainian national 
character established in the Russian culture. 
Need for security as a strange attractor has an ambivalent impact of the dynamics of the social 
chronotope. In one respect, it consolidates the regional border communities; yet, it is a potential source of 
dissatisfaction with the authorities being unable to overcome the existing dangers and threats. Such 
ambivalence turns this strange attractor into potentially confrontational. Most probably, it will gain 
significance if the present nonequilibrium turbulent chaos continues to exist in the Russian borderland 
http://dx.doi.org/10.15405/epsbs.2018.02.9 
Corresponding Author: Valentin Pavlovich Babintsev 
Selection and peer-review under responsibility of the Organizing Committee of the conference 
eISSN: 2357-1330 
	
	 83 
and will minimize the prospects for recovery and development of cross-border cooperation which is 
crucial both for the material welfare of border residents and for mutual cultural enrichment. .   
 
7. Conclusion 
The conducted survey proves that the dynamics of the social chronotope of the Russian-Ukrainian 
borderlands in the current nonequilibrium turbulent chaos conflicts with the fundamental needs of the 
population and the objective national interests. It opposes the strategically vital trend to form a global 
civilization which would balance global and ethnocultural development. The problem lies not only in the 
destruction of a common cultural model after the disintegration of the USSR, which is natural for 
delimitation, but in the formation of two autonomous social chronotopes on both sides of the border that 
are governed by strange attractors contributing to chaotization rather than harmonization of the systems. 
Without control of the chaos, it leads to increasing confrontation which is dangerous for both states and 
the whole Eurasian system.   
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